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The accumulation of large amount of sovereign reserves has fuelled an intense debate on the 
associated costs. In a world with liquidity crises and strategic default, we model a 
contracting game between international lenders and a country, which delivers the country's 
optimal portfolio choice and the cost of sovereign debt: at equilibrium, the sovereign 
allocates the borrowed resources to either liquid reserves or an illiquid and risky production 
project. We study how the opportunity cost of hoarding reserves is affected by the financial 
and technological characteristics of the economy. In line with recent empirical evidence, we 
find two important results: the cost of debt decreases in the level of reserves if the 
probability of liquidity shocks is high enough; however the cost of debt increases in reserves 
when the lenders anticipate that the country has an incentive to default after a liquidity 
shock. Indeed, we show that the country may choose to retain reserves instead of employing 
them to inject the liquidity needed to bring the production project to maturity. 
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Reinhart and Rogo (2010) document that after the Great Depression and consequent banking system crisis, a wave
of sovereign debt defaults arose during the 1930s. To establish this domino eect as a stylized fact in contemporary
history a piece is missing: the failure of major nancial institutions in the recent crisis to trigger a series of sovereign
debt crises in the years ahead. This threat calls for a reection on the management of sovereign liquidity and could
become a test for the strategy, mainly employed by emerging economies after the experience of the late '90s Asian
crisis, of accumulating large amounts of sovereign reserves as buer stock to face liquidity shocks.
In early 2000 this accumulation seemed to be justied by the self-insurance motive and to be broadly in line
with rules of thumb like the \Guidotti-Greenspan rule";2 however, the recent increase in the resources devoted to
reserves has made it urgent to understand the costs associated with this build-up. Rodrik (2006) measures the
opportunity cost of accumulating large amounts of liquid assets (in particular US treasury bonds) as the spread
between external borrowing costs and reserves' returns. Rodrik (2006) compares this \self-insurance premium"
with the expected cost of a nancial crisis in terms of reduced output and concludes that in the last decade the
amount of reserves accumulated by some countries has grown too much. In order to assess the opportunity cost
of holding reserves, we believe that two further elements should be taken into account: the impact of reserves on
future domestic output and on the cost of debt.
We analyse the opportunity cost of holding reserves in a world where the sovereign country is subject to liquidity
crises and always has the option to default on debt. We develop a model of optimal portfolio choice where a country's
resources are determined by a contracting game with international lenders, and characterize the equilibrium level
of debt price, sovereign reserves and expected growth. Reserves are the country choice variable. Instead, the debt
price is set by the lenders and the country's expected output results from the share of total borrowed resources that
is not devoted to reserves.
The strategic interaction between the agents is shaped by two crucial nancial frictions: lenders cannot inject
the resources needed in the event of a liquidity shock and the country cannot commit not to default on debt.3 These
frictions introduce asset incompleteness into our model, and this is necessary to disentangle the relationship between
the country's decision to default and the cost of sovereign debt. Indeed, if assets are not contingent, risk-neutral
competitive lenders incorporate the probability of default in the premium set on the debt contract.
The optimal choice of reserves made by the country arises from the equilibrium between two forces: on the one
hand, reserves are liquid assets that can be injected in the event of liquidity shocks and therefore help to avoid
defaults (precautionary motive), on the other hand, they distract resources from a more productive but illiquid
project. The country also takes into account the impact of reserves on the cost of debt; there are two conicting
eects at work: the positive one is that, by allowing the country to avoid default in the event of liquidity crises,
reserves raise the probability for lenders to be repaid; the negative eect is that reserves are not pledgeable in the
event of default and distract resources from the productive activity.
The novelty of our approach is that we do not assess whether the level of reserves is optimal in terms of its
opportunity cost per se. We take a more general perspective, considering that when the country decides the optimal
resource allocation it takes into account not only the opportunity cost of holding reserves in terms of the expected
1We thank Giancarlo Corsetti for invaluable discussions and advice. This paper also beneted from comments by Nicola Borri,
Fabio Castiglionesi, Andrea Finicelli, Anton Korinek and Wolf Wagner. Finally, we thank the participants at the European University
Institute and the Bank of Italy seminars. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the Bank
of Italy. All errors are ours.
2To be consistent with this rule, reserves should be equivalent to the country's short-term external debt.
3These assumptions are consistent with several papers in the literature and in particular with Holmstr om and Tirole (1996, 1998),
Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), Caballero and Panageas (2005) and Lorenzoni (2008).
5return of an alternative (illiquid) project, but also the eects of its choices on the price set by the lenders. In this
way, we can address a number of policy relevant questions regarding the impact of reserves on the cost of sovereign
debt and on the expected output.
We establish the following results. First of all, when there is a high probability of liquidity crises, the cost of
sovereign debt may decrease if the level of reserves is large enough; second, the country can decide to default at
equilibrium if it is hit by an adverse shock and nds it optimal to behave this way. We also analyse the eect of the
chosen level of reserves and the cost of debt on the sovereign expected output: we nd that if the probability of a
liquidity crisis is high enough, then larger reserves, by insuring the country against a shock, have a positive impact
on expected output.
Our framework allows us to analyse how the sovereign investment choices are aected by the nancial and
technological characteristics of the economy, namely the degree of riskiness of the production project and the level
of the country's capital account openness. More specically, we show that the opportunity cost of holding reserves
increases with the variance of the productive process due a limited liability eect: when deciding how to invest its
resources the country disregards the lower tail of output realization (since in those cases it would default), therefore
the return on the productive project is increasing in the risk associated with it. Finally, we show that, as the degree
of sovereign capital account openness increases, larger capital outows in the event of sudden stops increases the
country's incentives to default in such events.
We contribute to the literature that studies the optimal decision of sovereign countries to accumulate interna-
tional reserves in the presence of strategic default on sovereign debt, like Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). Alfaro and
Kanczuk (2009) employ a setup in which the sovereign keeps reserves while losing part of the output in the event
of strategic default on debt. In their model, the main upside of reserve accumulation is the possibility of employing
them to smooth consumption. They introduce the possibility of sovereign liquidity crises in the form of contagion
shocks (an abrupt variation in the interest rate) or sudden stops; however, in their setup reserves do not have a
particular role in avoiding such crises, instead they are imperfect substitutes of external debt reduction for smooth-
ing consumption. The main result they obtain is that the optimal policy of the country features nil international
reserves and the intuition is that the country prefers to smooth consumption by lowering debt exposure instead of
accumulating reserves. In our model, we study the eect of the country's willingness-to-repay concerns on the cost
of debt by modelling the funding game between lenders and sovereign and obtain the rather dierent result that
the optimal level of accumulated reserves can be positive at equilibrium. Remarkably, this is independent from
the working of the precautionary motive. In our setting the sovereign solves the investment game by comparing
the opportunity cost of reserves with respect to the productive activity: provided the former is low enough, then
hoarding reserves is rational. On top of this, we perform an analysis of the role that reserves have in providing an
insurance device against liquidity shocks and study whether self-insurance is preferable to a strategy that does not
feature the injection of the necessary liquidity following a shock.
The level of resources available to the country for the investment game is not exogenous, because we endogenously
determine the cost of sovereign debt. Instead, we take the level of outstanding liabilities as given and abstract from
considerations about the possibility of reducing short-term debt in order to create liquidity and thus lower the
impact of a shock. This assumption is consistent with the evidence in Rodrik (2006), which documents that, in
recent years, emerging economies have not reduced their exposure to short-term debt, while accumulating large
amounts of foreign liquid assets. Finally, we deliver our result by abstracting from the role that reserves have in
stabilizing exchange rates and promoting exports (which instead is the main focus of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and
Garber, 2003).
We also contribute to the literature that studies optimal contractual arrangements in the presence of commitment
6problems and non-contingent contracts, as in Arellano (2008). In analogy to Arellano (2008), we show that default
arises at equilibrium after an adverse shock occurs, consistently with the received empirical evidence. However,
while Arellano (2008) studies the relationship between default risk and output, consumption and foreign debt, we
look at the interaction between default risk and reserves, cost of debt and output.
We map the relationship between the cost of sovereign debt and the level of sovereign reserves: the amount
of reserves hoarded by a country may reduce the cost of debt. In particular, this happens if the precautionary
motive dominates. However, the opposite can occur: if the rationale behind the accumulation of liquid assets is
opportunistic (that is, if the country prefers to keep reserves instead of employing them in the event of a liquidity
shock), then an increase in their amount raises the cost of debt. This result, namely that the relationship between
reserves and the cost of sovereign debt is not monotonic, is supported by two pieces of empirical evidence. Levy
Yeyati (2008) nds in the data that holding reserves reduces the spread on the debt issued over the risk-free return
on assets to the extent that reserves lower the probability of a run-induced default; moreover, the empirical analysis
in Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil (2008) shows that the accumulation of reserves reduces the cost of borrowing only
up to a threshold and concludes that the level of reserves observed in Asian countries is in line with an optimal
insurance model.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the main features of the model. In Section 3 we
solve for the equilibrium of the game. First, we analyse a benchmark framework without reserves, then we introduce
the possibility for the country to (diversify its portfolio and) choose between investing in liquid reserves and an
illiquid production project. In Section 4 we analyse the model's equilibrium by undertaking numerical simulations,
while two possible extensions of the main setting are presented in Section 5: in the rst we model the optimal
investment choice of a risk-averse country, in the second we introduce a supranational organization, e.g. the IMF,
that can intervene to nance the country in a liquidity crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a sovereign country that needs to borrow D from international lenders. At stage 0a, the lenders set
the rate of return on the resources lent to the country and at stage 0b, the country decides on the allocation of
the same resources.4 At stage 1, a liquidity shock may take place: if a shock occurs the country has to decide
whether to default at stage 2; in the absence of the shock the game proceeds to stage 3. At stage 3 the productivity
shock takes place and at stage 4 the sovereign can again choose whether to default on debt. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate, respectively, the timing of the game and the game-tree. We solve the model by backward induction and
the equilibrium concept we employ is the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
In this Section, we present in detail how we model each relevant node and the main ingredients of the game.
2.1 The Lending Game
Our economy is populated by a continuum of atomistic and risk-neutral lenders (indexed by i 2 I), from which the
country can borrow. Each of these lenders is able to lend D, so that the sovereign must borrow from a subset of
mass 1 of them. The total mass of lenders is large, ensuring that perfect competition prevails and lenders do not
extract any rent; moreover, the lenders are risk-neutral and have unlimited access to fund at the risk-less interest
(that we assume to be nil).
4For ease of exposition, we present the borrowing decision and the investment decision in sequence. However, if the two games were
solved simultaneously we would obtain the same results.
7The lending game can be viewed as a general (common agency) contracting game between a principal (the
sovereign) and multiple agents (the lenders):5 as in Bolton and Jeanne (2007), investors participate in a bidding
game following the sovereign's announcement of a fund raising goal of D. Lenders move rst by each making a bid
simultaneously. The sovereign then decides which bids to accept.
The lenders' utility is equal to the value of the repayment D discounted by the probability that the sovereign
repays in full. At the bidding stage of the game, then, each lender i makes an oer on the rate of return, r(i), that
is required to break even in expectation. A lender i solves a problem of the following sort:
D = D(1 + r(i))ProbfThe Country is Solventg ()
1=(1 + r(i)) = ProbfThe Country is Solventg ()
(i)  ProbfThe Country is Solventg:
Consequently, in the model the contract species the discount factor (i) = 1=(1 + r(i)) that a lender i asks in
exchange for a loan D. A Nash equilibrium of the lending game is dened by a set of bids ((i))i2I such that, for
all i, bid (i) maximizes lender i's utility taking all the other bids (j), with j 6= i, as given. Clearly, at equilibrium
the sovereign squeezes all the surplus from the lending relationship and (randomly) selects among a set of identical
bids, (j) = (i) = , so we can focus on a representative sovereign-lender pair.
2.2 The Investment Game
The country is risk-neutral and can invest its funds in public expenditure, g, and/or reserves, R. Therefore, the
sovereign feasibility constraint is given by
D = g + R () g = D   R: (1)
When deciding resource allocation, the country maximizes its expected utility, denoted by E(U(:)): this is
determined by the amount of liquid resources gathered and by the expected value of output. In the model, reserves
(R) are a storage and liquid technology that can be carried over from the stage in which they are accumulated to
the nal stage of the game.
The production activity is the illiquid technology: it requires public expenditure (g) as sole input and is subject
to a productivity shock, z. The assumption we make is that the output materializes at stage 4, after the country
has decided on the allocation of its resources and uncertainty over the shocks occurs. More specically, the output
is generated by a production function, Y (z;g), that is linearly aected by the productivity shock and that, using
(1), can be rewritten as:
Y (z;g) = zY (g) = zY (;R):
The shock z is such that z s F(z), where F(z), the cumulative distribution function, is twice dierentiable and
continuous and f(z), the probability distribution function, is given by dF(z)=dz = f(z). For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that z follows a continuous uniform distribution over [1   c;1 + c]; however, our results hold under
alternative assumptions on the distribution of z.6
Finally, the function Y (;R) is twice dierentiable,7 with Y 0(:)  0, Y 00(:) < 0, it is increasing in , decreasing
in R and satises standard Inada Conditions (limg!0 Y (:) = 0, limg!0 Y 0(:) = 1 and limg!+1 Y 0(:) = 0).
5See, for example, Bernheim and Whinston (1986a,b), Hart and Tirole (1990).
6In particular, Appendix D shows that the results of the model carry over under continuous distributions with exponential density
functions, like the normal and log-normal distributions.
7We choose this compact notation instead of Y (D   R) to stress that the endogenous variables that aect Y (:;:) are  and R.
82.3 The Liquidity Shock
We assume that the country incurs in the risk of a liquidity shock at an intermediate stage, before the outcome of
the production activity.
Following Chang and Velasco (2005) we assume that, with probability  2 (0;1); the illiquid project needs a
further infusion of capital  at stage two in order to be completed.
If a liquidity shock occurs the country can only use the accumulated reserves to inject , while it cannot dismantle
the capital invested in the production process. If it decides not to tackle the shock with the infusion of capital, the
country defaults on the process and retains reserves.
2.4 The Default Decisions
There are two stages in the model at which the country may choose to default. The rst is after the realization
of the liquidity shock at stage two. The second is after the realization of the productivity shock at the nal stage
(when output is realized). In this way, we introduce the two main frictions of the model: the rst is that the lender
commits not to inject the resources needed by the country if a liquidity shock occurs. The second is that the country
cannot undertake not to default when the realized output is lower than the face value of debt.8
In analogy to what is typically assumed in the literature (e.g. Bolton and Jeanne, 2007), the cost of default for
the country consists of losing the entire output.9 However, in the event of default the country keeps the reserves
that it has accumulated, while the lender gets nothing.10
For simplicity, we distinguish between two plans (that we denote F and N) depending on the country's choice at
stage two to inject the needed liquidity should the shock occur. We nd it a useful the distinction as it allows as to
easily characterize all possible branches of the game-tree. Indeed, because of the nancial friction of no commitment
on the country side, at each stage the sovereign can decide to default if it is convenient to do so, i.e. if the expected
utility from defaulting is greater that the one from continuation.11
[FIGURES 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 illustrates the branches of the game-tree corresponding to the two plans. Under plan N the country
chooses to default if hit by the liquidity shock. Instead, under plan F the country chooses to face the shock, but
for this decision to be credible it must also be feasible and time-consistent. Indeed, if at the investment game
the country accumulates a level of reserves lower than  then it cannot inject the needed capital to face the shock
(resource constraint). Moreover, a problem of limited commitment may arise: if the country's payo from the
continuation of the game following the shock is less than  then the country will prefer to default after the shock
and retain reserves (no-default constraint).
Finally, the country may default after the realization of the productivity shock. In this case, the lender can pledge
only a fraction of the output generated by the illiquid project, as in the models of funding in the presence of moral
hazard (e.g. Holmstr om and Tirole, 1997).
2.5 A Discussion of Our Assumptions
To keep our model tractable and study the interaction between the eects that crucially determine the country's
choices, we make a number of important assumptions.
8Or, equivalently, that the lender cannot act as residual claimant if realized output is lower than the face value of debt.
9See Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) for a discussion on output losses in the event of default.
10This assumption is consistent with Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009).
11Notice, however, that the crucial decision at time zero is how to allocate resources between R and g, and the nal equilibrium is
always at most one.
9First of all, we treat the level of the face value of debt D as an exogenous variable. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009)
show that debt and reserves can both be employed to smooth a country's utility, and therefore their levels are
connected. However, Rodrik (2006) nds that emerging economies seem to be more active in deciding how to
allocate resources and, in particular, in increasing the level of accumulated reserves; instead, the level of short-term
debt has not changed much in time. In this sense, ours can be considered a short-term perspective theory, in which
creditors set the debt price, either in the principal or secondary market, by looking at the economic fundamentals
of each country and taking the amount of outstanding debt as given. Moreover, the fact that in the model the
lender decides the debt discount factor () implies that she inuences the total amount of resources available for
sovereign investment, and in this sense we develop a model with endogenous country resources.
In the setting presented above there are two shocks; at time two a liquidity shock may hit the country and at
time three the productivity process z is realized. We assume that these two shocks are orthogonal to each other
and to the main variables of the model (especially reserves). An alternative approach would be to assume that, if
a liquidity shock occurs, output would be adversely aected, by the shock itself, but also by a common underlying
process that guides the two uncertainties. Moreover, the liquidity and productive shock processes may be linked to
the variables set at time zero: for example, empirical studies show that countries with higher reserves performed
better during the recent nancial crisis, both in terms of output and of lower exchange rate depreciation and capital
ight. The analysis of the correlation among the shocks could lead to new dynamics and add interesting results to
the model; however, we leave it for future research.
The interest rate on the safe assets bought to build up reserves is set to zero. Also, in the event of default the
country loses the entire output. These two assumptions may look somewhat extreme; however, (i) they are not
uncommon in the literature and (ii) we do believe that they can be introduced without loss of generality, as a more
realistic parameterization would not change the nature of the results we obtain.
3 Solution of the Model
The analysis is conducted under the following simplifying technical restriction:
A1 : jY 0;Rj > j z;Rj:
Assumption (A1) is needed to make sure that the solution to the country's maximization problem is unique and
implies that the output is more sensitive to changes in reserves than the expected productivity level in the case of
no default. More specically, Y 0;R represents the elasticity of the derivative of the production function to changes
in the reserve level, while  z;R is the elasticity to changes in reserves of the default threshold  z, which will be dened
in what follows.12
In order to better disentangle the impact of reserves in this setting, we rst solve the model assuming that
reserves cannot be accumulated: clearly, in this benchmark the country can never cover the liquidity shock. Then,
we allow the country to decide how to allocate D between g and R.
3.1 Benchmark without Reserves
If the country is hit by the shock in t = 1, then it is not able to repay  and is already in default at t = 1. Conversely,
if the country is not hit by the shock, then it defaults at the nal stage if:




12In Section 4, we perform a set of numerical simulations of the model and show that (A1) is naturally satised by a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function.
10 z represents the threshold level of the productive process: if the realized productivity is higher, then the country
repays its creditors and keeps the residual, otherwise the country defaults on debt and loses the entire output.
This introduces a problem of limited liability on the country side, which inuences the outcome of the investment
game.
At the investment stage, resources are entirely invested in g. At t = 0, the lender sets the optimal  as to
break-even in expectation:
D = D(1   )
Z 1
 z()
dF(z) ()  = (1   )[1   F( z())]  (1   )G(): (2)
In the absence of reserves, the lender takes into account that the break-even is attained only if the liquidity
shock does not take place, that is with probability (1 ). For convenience, when we solve for the lender's problem
we denote by G(:) the survival function and interpret it as the probability that the country is fully solvent after the
productivity shock.
Lemma 1.
9!  2 (0;1) s.t.  = (1   )G():
Proof. See Appendix A.
[FIGURE 4(a) ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4(a) illustrates the result of Lemma 1. The deal signed at the initial stage between the lender and the
sovereign can be implemented by a debt contract in which the lender earns (D D) (or, equivalently, Dr=(1+r),
with r=(1 + r) = 1   ) provided the country repays in full, zero otherwise.
3.2 Framework with Reserves
In what follows, we allow the country to accumulate reserves at the investment game stage.
If the liquidity shock does not occur at t = 1, then the model proceeds as in the framework without reserves and
at t = 4 the country defaults after the realization of the productivity shock if the following condition holds:




Conversely, if the liquidity shock occurs at t = 1, we distinguish between two cases, depending on whether the
country decides to face the liquidity shock (plan F) or not (plan N).
Plan F
At t = 4 the country defaults after the realization of the productivity shock if the following condition holds:




At t = 2, the country would inject the new capital and go on with the project. Clearly, a necessary condition for
the country to do so is that it accumulates enough liquidity. In other words, the outcome of the investment stage
must be such that R   (resource constraint).
Moreover, we analyse whether the decision to inject liquidity after the shock is sub-game perfect. Given the
choice on R by the country under plan F and the consequent contract oered at t = 0 by the lender, it must be that
11the sovereign has incentive to continue with the liquid project instead of defaulting strategically at t = 2, otherwise
the same plan would not be time-consistent. The no-default constraint that has to hold follows:
R    +
Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z)  R ()
Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z)  :




dF(z) ()  = 1   F( z(;R))  G(;R):
In this case, the formulation of the investor's problem takes into account that the sovereign does not default
after a liquidity shock.
At t = 0b, the country decides to invest D in g and/or R by solving the following problem:
max
R
E(UF(;R)) = R +
Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z)   ; (3)
The country is certain to R, because reserves are not lost in the event of default. The second term in (3) is
the expected value of the production project net of D: this second term is positive by construction, because the
expected value of output is truncated downwards by  z. The third term in expression (3) is the expected value of
the liquidity shock.
The maximization problem in (3) is solved under the aforementioned constraints:
Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z)  ; (4)
R  ; (5)
which make sure that the implementation of plan F is sub-game perfect.
Plan N
At t = 2, if the sovereign chooses to default after the liquidity shock, it loses output but keeps the accumulated
liquidity (R).
At t = 0a, the lender replies by setting  as to break-even in expectation:
D = D(1   )
Z 1
 z(;R)
dF(z) ()  = (1   )[1   F( z(;R))]  (1   )G(;R):
In this case, the lender anticipates that the country defaults on the liquidity shock in t = 2.
At t = 0b, the country's choice of R is derived by solving the following problem:
max
R2[0;D]
E(UN(;R)) = R + (1   )
Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z):
The decision to default on the liquidity shock implies two things: the rst is that the sovereign obtains the net
expected payo from the production project only if exempted from the liquidity shock (with probability 1  ); the
second is that the sovereign does not need to inject  to bring the illiquid project to the end. Finally, the country
gets R in all states of the world.
123.3 Equilibrium Denition
The equilibrium is dened by the vector f;Rg such that the country's behaviour is optimal and the lender breaks
even in expectation. Moreover, with liquidity shock coverage (that is, when plan F is chosen), the country's actions
must be sub-game perfect, insofar as both the no-default constraint and the resource constraint must be satised.
Denition 1.
Dene F  f
F ;R
F g as the pair that characterizes the plan in which the country decides to face the liquidity shock.
At F  f
F ;R
F g, the resource constraint is satised
R
F  ;







F )   D]dF(z)  :
Dene N  f
N ;R
N g as the pair that characterizes the plan in which the country decides not to face the
liquidity shock.
The SPNE of the game is given by plan F if E(U(
F ;R
F ))  E(U(
N ;R
N )) and the relevant constraints are
satised, otherwise plan N is chosen by the country.
In the following, we rst determine f
N ;R
N g and f
F ;R
F g. Then, we analyse the country's choice between
plan N and plan F, and the features of the corresponding equilibrium.
We nd that when the country accumulates reserves, the discount factor set by the lender is higher than in
the benchmark without reserves if the country has an incentive to inject liquidity after the liquidity shock (that is,
under plan F) and the probability of the liquidity shock () is big enough. At the same time, a high enough value
of  implies that the country's expected output is greater under plan F than under plan N and in the no-reserves
case. Finally, we show that the lower the incidence of the liquidity shock (), the more likely it is that the country
will ahve an incentive to face the shock (and that plan F will arise at equilibrium).
3.4 Equilibrium Analysis
First of all, we analyse country's decision to accumulate reserves and the consequent choice of the discount factor
 taken by the lender under plan N.
Lemma 2.
Assume (A1) holds. If
lim
R!0
















N = (1   )G(
N ;R
N ):
13Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 shows that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies under plan N, provided condition (6)
is satised. We now turn to the determination of the value of reserves and discount factor under plan F, that is
when the country chooses to inject the needed liquidity after the shock  occurs at stage t = 1.
Lemma 3.


























































Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 3 shows that, under the relevant conditions outlined above, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies under plan F if and only if either the resource constraint or the no-default constraint binds. Instead, there
is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if both the resource and the no-default constraints are binding.13
When deciding the optimal value of R, the country trades-o the marginal return of reserves, equal to 1,









@R dF(z) under plan N. Overall, then, the sovereign accumulates a positive level of reserves provided
the marginal return of the illiquid project is low enough. However, the fact that under plan N the country reaches
13The intuition for this outcome is given in the following. If the resource constraint is binding, then the country would like to
accumulate a lower level of reserves than the necessary injection, but the constraint satisfaction xes R exactly at . In other words, the
resource constraint sets a higher R than in an unconstrained optimum. The role of the no-default constraint is the opposite. Since the
expected residual output after repaying the creditors (in the event of no default, that is the left-hand-side of the no-default constraint)
is decreasing in R, a binding no-default constraint implies that although the country would like to accumulate a higher level of reserves,
it has to reduce R in order to satisfy the no-default constraint with an equality. In other words, the impact of the level of reserves in
the two constraints goes in two opposite directions: R should increase with respect to the unconstrained optimum in order to satisfy
the resource constraint; R should decrease with respect to the unconstrained optimum to satisfy the no-default constraint. Overall, this
implies that an equilibrium in which both constraints are contemporaneously binding cannot exist.
14the nal stage only if it is exempted from the liquidity shock (with probability 1   ) implies that, ceteris paribus,
the level of accumulated liquidity is higher there.
The country defaults when the value of the productivity shock z falls below  z, that is, it is limitedly liable in
the obligation to repay the lender. This aects the sovereign decisions at the investment game, because, as will be
further explored in the section on comparative statics, the expected return of the output is boosted by a higher
volatility of the shock z, at the expense of the investment in the liquid asset (R).
3.4.1 The Impact of Reserves on the Discount Factor set by the Lender
The sovereign choice to inject liquidity after the shock occurs at t = 1 aects the discount factor set by the lender.
If the country decides to default at t = 2 (as it does under plan N) then the problem solved by the lender is
analogous to the one in Lemma 1, with the dierence that the value of reserves was nil there. The following lemma
compares the value of the discount factor in the benchmark with the one that the country obtains when choosing
plan N.
Lemma 4. The optimal value of  set by the lender in response to plan N, 
N , is lower than the one set in the
benchmark without reserves, .
Without the reserves' insurance role, from the point of view of the lender the accumulation of liquid assets
diverts resources from the production activity and increases the likelihood of sovereign default after the realization
of the productivity shock. Consequently, the amount of resources available to the country to sustain sovereign
investment production in plan N shrinks.14
If the country chooses to face the shock at t = 1 (plan F), then the impact on the problem solved by the lender
is ambiguous, and eventually depends on . With respect to the framework without reserves, on the one hand the
accumulation of liquid assets reduces expected output, on the other hand it allows the country to face the liquidity
shock successfully.
Below, we compare the discount factor set by the lender in plan F with the discount factor in the benchmark
case without reserves.
Lemma 5.
At  = ;R = R
F ; G(;R
F ))  (1   )G() ()
   
F( z(;R
F ))   F( z())
[1   F( z())]
2 (0;1):
Proof. The proof follows by comparing G(;R
F )) with G().
Therefore, if the probability of a shock occurring is greater than , the discount factor of debt with reserves
is higher than in the case without reserves. Remember that, in the model, there is an inverse relationship between
the discount factor  and the rate of return r, since  = 1=(1 + r); consequently, if  increases the rate of return
decreases.
[FIGURES 4(b) and 4(c) ABOUT HERE]
14Remember that there is an inverse relationship between the discount factor and the rate of return asked by the lender: a higher
discount factor is equivalent to a lower rate of return.
15Lemma 5 is illustrated in Figure 4(b) and 4(c). More specically, we show that when the probability attached
to the occurrence of the liquidity shock () is high enough, then the discount factor is higher when the country
accumulates reserves in excess of  and injects liquidity (plan F) than in the benchmark case without reserves
(Figure 4c). The lender takes into account that reserves help the country to be solvent when the liquidity shock
occurs and \prices" D accordingly. In the complementary case, the lender anticipates that the accumulated reserves
are \too high" relative to the real danger of the shock occurring ( < ) and sets a lower discount factor () under
plan F with respect to the benchmark without reserves (see Figure 4b).
Proposition 1 summarizes the resulting impact of reserves on the lender's decisions under plan F and plan N
with respect to the case without reserves.
Proposition 1.
 If the country does not face the liquidity shock, then  > 
N .
 If the country faces the liquidity shock, then the impact of the accumulation of reserves on the value of the
discount factor  depends on the probability of the liquidity shock, :
{ If  <  then  > 
F .
{ If    then   
F .
Proof. See the discussion above.
In the following section, we study the impact of the accumulation of reserves on the country's expected out-
put.
3.4.2 The Impact of Reserves on the Country's Expected Output
The decisions to accumulate reserves and face the liquidity shock aect the country's expected output in a way that
is even clearer than in the case of the discount factor.






















First of all, we compare the outcomes of plan N with the benchmark, in terms of expected output.
Lemma 6. The expected value of output in plan N is lower than in the benchmark without reserves.
The result in Lemma 6 is a consequence of the result in Lemma 4, in which it is shown that when the country
does not inject the capital needed to oset the liquidity shock (plan N), the lender sets a discount factor that is
lower than in the benchmark, implying that D > 
N D. Moreover, in plan N the country invests in reserves,
further reducing the resources allotted to the illiquid project.
16In plan F the country is fully insured against the liquidity shock; instead, in the benchmark the country is
certain to default if it is hit by the same shock. This consideration leads us to the following result.
Lemma 7. If  > ^ , the expected value of output in plan F is larger than in the benchmark without reserves.
Summarizing the results in Lemmata 6 and 7, as  grows to 1 the expected value of production in the case
where the country injects liquidity after the shock (plan F) dominates the other two cases. This leads directly to
Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2.












 If the country faces the liquidity shock, then the impact of the accumulation of reserves on the value of the
expected output depends on the probability of the liquidity shock, :
{ If  < ^  then (1   )
R 1




F ) zY (
F ;R
F )dF(z).
{ If   ^  then (1   )
R 1




F ) zY (
F ;R
F )dF(z).
Proof. See the discussion above.
In Lemmata 2 and 3, we determined the pairs f
N ;R
N g and f
F ;R
F g that solve the country's maximization
problem and the lender's zero-prot condition under plan N and plan F, respectively. In Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 we analyse how the discount factor and the expected output are aected by the probability of a
liquidity shock.
In the next section, we continue studying the country's choice at equilibrium by undertaking some comparative
statics on the exogenous variables of the model.
3.4.3 Comparative Statics
The goal of the this section is to analyse the impact of other characteristics of the economy that have so far been
kept xed. We investigate the eects on the resource allocation { in reserves or public expenditure { of an increase
in the variability of the investment project, and therefore its risk, and of an increase in the dimension of capital
outows in the event of a liquidity crisis, .
The level of reserves is optimally chosen by looking at the opportunity cost of holding them in terms of the














In both cases, the opportunity cost has to equal the return on reserves (recall that, for simplicity, we xed the
interest rate on the liquid and safe asset at zero, and therefore the return on reserves is equal to 1).
17To assess the impact of the distribution of the shock, and in particular of its variance, on the opportunity cost
of holding reserves, we begin by using the assumption that z is distributed as a continuous uniform with support
[1   c;1 + c]; this implies that: Z 1
 z(;R)









( z(;R))2   (1 + c)(1   c)
16c2 :
Therefore, in the case of a continuous uniform distribution, as c increases above unity the incentive that a coun-
try has to invest an additional unit of resources in reserves decreases in both plan F and plan N.15 An increase
of c also triggers an increase in the variance of the uniform distribution, which is equal to c2=3. Consequently, we
can conclude that in the case of the uniform distribution, an increase in the variance can boost the incentive to
de-cumulate reserves. This result is even more robust in the case of exponential probability density functions, for
which a jump in the variance of the distribution increases the value of
R 1
 z(;R) zdF(z) and makes hoarding reserves
relatively less protable.16
Corollary 1.
An increase in the variance of the productivity shock z increases the opportunity cost of reserves.
In both the distributions considered above, an increase in the variance does not change the expected value of the
productivity shock; however, it increases the expected value of z given the possibility of the country defaulting. In
other words, Corollary 1 is linked to a limited liability eect: the country enjoys the upper tail of the distribution of
the realizations of the productivity shock while it disregards the lower tail. Therefore, an increase in the riskiness
of the illiquid project raises the opportunity cost of holding reserves and inates sovereign incentive to invest in g
instead of R.17 We further investigate the impact of the limited liability eect in the section where the optimal
portfolio allocation of a risk-averse country is studied in the extension presented below.
We now turn our attention to , the amount of liquid resources the country needs to inject in the event of a
liquidity shock at t = 1. This parameter could be interpreted as a proxy for the capital account openness of the
country and it therefore represents capital ight in a sudden stop. In line with Obstfeld et al. (2009),  could more
generally represent the fraction of the M2 aggregate (a proxy for the size of the banking system) the country needs
to inject should a double drain occur.
In our model,  does not aect the opportunity cost directly; however, it adversely aects country's expected
utility of plan F. Moreover,  has an impact on the no-default constraint the country has to satisfy in order to
credibly adhere to plan F: Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z)  :
Intuitively, as the liquidity needs increase, the constraint becomes more binding, and therefore it is more likely
that the equilibrium choice of reserves under plan F is constrained. All these reasons lead us to the conclusion in
15Notice that @Y (;R)=@R is independent from the shape of the distribution of z.
16To see this, note that, in the case of exponential probability density functions, were the variance to rise, the value of
R 1
 1 zdF(z)
would stay the same. Instead, as long as  z(;R) < 1, an increase in the variance implies that the truncated expected value of z weighted
by its density f(z) rises.




An increase in the needed liquidity injection () makes the emergence of plan F less likely at equilibrium.
In the next Section, to gain further insights on the value of the model's key variables (reserves, debt discount
factor and public expenditures) at equilibrium, and see under which conditions a country decides to default should
the liquidity shock occur, we undertake a numerical analysis.
4 Simulations
Here we present a numerical example that illustrates the results above.18 More specically, it is assumed that the
production function is a Cobb-Douglas of the following type:
Y (z;g) = zY (g) = zY (;R) = z(D   R):
Also, we maintain the assumption for which the productivity shock is distributed as a uniform random vari-
able:
z  U(1;c2=3);z 2 [1   c;1 + c]:
There are ve parameters to be set:
 income share of capital 0:3
D amount of debt as % of GDP 40%
 capital infusion as % of GDP 10%
c support of the productivity process 2
 probability of the liquidity shock 15%
The income share of capital is taken from the literature. The face value of debt D is chosen in order to obtain
on average an amount of gross debt over GDP of around 40%, in line with the data for 2009 reported by the IMF
in World Economic Outlook for emerging and developing countries. The needed capital infusion in the event of a
liquidity shock is xed at 10% of the expected GDP, as proposed in Rodrik (2006) and Obstfeld et al. (2009). The
variance of the productivity process and the probability of the liquidity shock are arbitrary. We then make them
vary to check how those parameters aect the choice variables,  and R, and to check the robustness of our results.
With the proposed parameters we obtain estimates of the value of reserves over expected output of around 15%,
slightly below the 20% estimated by Jeanne (2007). Moreover, in our simulations the discount factor generates a
rate of return r that oscillates around 1: this is the same rate of return that would be generated by a 10-year bond
capitalized at an annual interest rate of about 7%, which is a value of the annual rate in line with the empirical
evidence in Borri and Verdelhan (2009).19
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 5 reports the main results of the simulation when the probability of the liquidity shock moves from zero
to 50%. It shows how the cost of debt, the expected output, the reserve level and the country's expected welfare
vary when the probability of the liquidity shock increases.
18For the sake of the exposition, we focus on cases in which an equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is well-dened.
19Recall that the discount factor  is equal to 1=(1 + r): In our model,  is inversely correlated to the cost of debt: an increase in the
value of  set by the lender reects an increase in the probability that the lender expects the country to be solvent and stands for a
decrease in the cost of debt.
19The upper-left panel shows that the cost of debt increases with the increase in the risk of the liquidity shock in
two cases, namely in the framework without reserves and when the country chooses not to face the liquidity shock
when it occurs (plan N).20 Instead, if the country decides to face the liquidity shock (plan F) the cost of debt is
constant for any value of , because the country is perfectly insured independently of the probability of the adverse
event occurring.
The upper-left panel of Figure 5 also shows the threshold  (which here corresponds to a probability of the
liquidity shock around 4%): if the probability of the liquidity shock is higher than , then the discount factor in
the framework without reserves () rises above than the discount factor with reserves when the lender anticipates
that the country will face the liquidity shock (
F ). From this simulation, we also infer that when the country
decides not to face the liquidity shock the cost of debt is always higher ( lower) because this choice makes the
lender worse o.
The upper-right panel of Figure 5 displays the path of sovereign expected output. The expected output is higher
when the country cannot divert resources from the productive project (that is, in the framework with R = 0) if the
probability of a liquidity shock is below the threshold ^  (which here corresponds to a probability of the liquidity
shock of around 30%). When the liquidity shock becomes more likely, the amount of total resources invested under
plan F becomes very large. Moreover in expectation, a larger fraction of the expected amount of output is lost,
due to the default in liquidity crises.
The amount of accumulated reserves, reported in the lower-left panel, decreases when  increases with no capital
infusion, because the resources available to the country (equal to 
N D) decrease with . If, instead, the country
decides to face the liquidity shock, should it occur, the level of reserves does not depend on the probability of the
shock and the two constraints (resource constraint and no-default constraint) are slack at any level of :
Finally, the lower-right panel plots the country's welfare in the two plans which the country can choose between:
when the country accumulates reserves and faces the liquidity shock (plan F), the welfare is always higher than if
it decides not to inject capital (plan N). Moreover, the resource constraint (lower-left panel) and the no-default
constraint (not reported in the gure) are always satised under plan F, so the country chooses to face the liquidity
shock if it occurs.
From this rst simulation of the model we can conclude that, under the chosen parameters, the country accumu-
lates reserves and injects capital if the liquidity shock occurs at any value of . The lender anticipates this choice
when setting the discount factor of debt and sets 
F to satisfy its zero-prot condition.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The simulations in Figure 6 show how the variables of interest and the nal equilibrium of the model vary when
the variance of the underlying productivity process (equal to c2=3) moves from 1 to 52
5. As mentioned in the section
on comparative statics, when the variability of the productivity shock increases, the opportunity cost of holding
reserves increases, because of a limited liability eect. Consequently, the country chooses a lower level of reserves
and the discount factor on debt decided by the lender in response is lower, because more resources are invested in
the productive activity.
Therefore, as the variance rises, the trade-o between accumulating enough reserves to face the shock and putting
more resources in the productive project leads to a smaller pile of liquid and safe assets. There is a threshold of
the variance for which the country decides to gather R =  and at which the resource constraint becomes binding
20Notice that in the framework in which the country can accumulate a positive amount of reserves, the case \no reserves" cannot be a
credible choice since, in the absence of commitment, the country will always prefer a positive amount of reserves at any discount factor
oered by the lender as represented by plan F and plan N. We simulate the equilibrium variables in the framework with no reserves
in order to have means of comparison.
20under plan F.21
The overall impact on expected output and welfare is that they both increase as the sovereign decides to de-
cumulate reserves. This is due to the role of residual claimant of the country if it decides not to default. Finally,
when the country decides to face the liquidity shock (plan F), the expected output is higher than when the country
chooses not to inject the necessary liquidity (plan N), but for the case of a very high level of variability of the shock.
This is due to the fact that under plan F the level of R cannot get smaller than the needed liquidity infusion.
The equilibrium chosen is plan N for very low levels of the variance, due to the high cost of facing the shock
compared with the opportunity cost of investing in output (weighted by the probability of the liquidity shock not
occurring).
For higher levels of the variability, however, the country prefers to accumulate more reserves and face the liquidity
shock since the expected output increases. The welfare under plan F increases more than under plan N because
the underlying cost is xed in the rst case () while it increases with the variance in the second case (it is the
expected output weighted by the probability of the liquidity shock).
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The last simulation performed shows how the country's choice of equilibrium plan is aected by the importance
of the liquidity shock (). In Figure 7, we let the value of  vary. We change the values of parameters D and c as
follows:
 income share of capital 0:3
D amount of debt as % of GDP 60%
c support of the productivity process
p
3
 probability of a liquidity shock 15%
We increase the value of D, the available liquidity, and decrease the value of c, the variability of the productivity
process. In this way we are able to show the inuence of the no-default constraint, reported in the lower-left panel.
Under plan F, when the no-default constraint becomes binding, the country has to choose a level of reserves lower
than the unconstrained optimum; this in turn induces the lender to oer a better discount for the debt (higher ).
The two eects contribute to an increase in the expected output and welfare. As  further increases the level of
reserves approaches the resource constraint and therefore, as proved in Appendix C, an equilibrium no longer exists
under plan F. The only equilibrium of the game features the choice of plan N.
5 Extensions
In what follows we study two possible extensions of the present analysis. In the rst, we introduce risk-aversion in
order to show that the optimal level of reserves can be signicantly higher if we change the shape of the country's
utility function. In the second extension, a third player is introduced: we assume that a supranational organization
can provide the liquidity needed in the event of a liquidity crisis. In this way we relax the friction on the nancial
markets' commitment not to intervene in the event of a liquidity shock.
5.1 Risk-averse utility function
In the main model, we assume that the country is risk-neutral, therefore it takes into account only the expected
value of alternative investments either in safe and liquid assets (reserves) or in a risky project (output). In line
21In this simulation, the no-default constraint is always veried for plan F and is not reported in the gure.
21with Arellano (2008), in the following we assume that the country is risk-averse, that is, it also looks at the second
moment of alternative investment opportunities. We expect to nd that, all else being equal, the country prefers
to invest more in the safe asset, so that the relative level of reserves chosen should be higher than in the previous
analysis with linear utility. Notice that nothing changes for the lender, who is assumed to be risk-neutral and
price the debt taking into account the same trade-o induced by the reserves as in the main model: reserves divert
resources from the productive investment, but on the other hand they can be employed to face the liquidity crisis,
should it occur, and therefore avoid default at time two.
We make use of a standard CRRA utility function with a parameter of risk aversion equal to 1. Following
Section 3.2, we re-write the expected output and the related constraints for the two plans (F and N) by making
use of a logarithmic utility function.
Plan F
At t = 0b, the country maximizes the following expression:
max
R
E(UF(;R)) = (1   )
"Z 1
 z(;R)















subject to the no-default and resource constraints:
Z  z(;R)
 1
log(R   )dF(z) +
Z 1
 z(;R)
[zY (;R)   D + R   ]dF(z)  log(R);
R  :
The resource constraint does not change in the new setup, while the no-default constraint incorporates the
disutility generated by uncertainty.
Plan N
In this case, at t = 0b the country maximizes the following expression:
max
R
E(UN(;R)) = (1   )
"Z 1
 z(;R)






We conduct a numerical simulation to nd the equilibrium pair (~ ; ~ R). In line with the analysis conducted for
the probability of liquidity shock () that varies, we set the four parameters as reported in the table below:
 income share of capital 0:3
D amount of debt as % of GDP 40%
 capital infusion as % of GDP 10%
c support of the productivity process 2
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
22The simulations are reported in Figure 8. In line with the previous analysis, plan F is the one implemented at
any value of  between 0 and 50%. Notice that in this case, even under plan F, the probability of a liquidity crisis
aects all the equilibrium variables. In particular, it reduces the expected welfare, induces the country to invest
more in reserves, which in turn makes creditors x a higher debt discount factor. Plan N, with this parametrization,
coincides with the case of no-reserves, since the country would like to accumulate a negative amount of reserves,
and therefore the constrained equilibrium is at R = 0. As a consequence, in this case the country's expected welfare
collapses, because of the shape of the utility function, and this plan is never implemented at equilibrium.
In the present simulations the threshold  is higher than with linear utility and equal to about 10%. The
threshold ^ , instead, is not reported in the second panel. For  between 0 and 50%, the output with no reserves is
always higher than under plan F. This happens for two reasons: the rst is that a large fraction of the available
resources is put in reserves instead of in the risky investment, the second is that in the case of a risk-averse country
the expected output decreases with  under plan F.
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
In Figure 9, we compare the amount of resources invested in reserves in terms of expected output in the two
cases, namely with linear and logarithmic utility. With logarithmic utility, the amount of resources saved in reserves
is about 70% of the expected output. It is a very high level, exceeding by far that of reserves in the case of linear
utility.
With our analysis, we do not pretend to predict the optimal level of reserves; however, the results that emerge
from this extension allow us to conclude that, by making the hypothesis of linear utility, researchers can obtain
only a lower bound for the optimal level of reserves. This lower bound needs to be corrected upwards in the case of
perceived risk aversion by the economic authorities.
5.2 IMF intervention
In this section, we introduce a supranational organization, e.g. the IMF, which can intervene in the interim period
and help the country by injecting  should the liquidity shock occur.22 We assume that the application for IMF
intervention is decided by the country before the contracting stage; therefore, at time zero the lender and the
country already know whether the IMF will intervene in a liquidity shock. Moreover, the intervention takes place
by means of an instrument that covers the entire amount of liquidity needed.
At t = 4, if not hit by the liquidity shock, the country defaults if z   z(;R)  D=Y (;R).
Instead, if hit by the shock , at t = 4 the country has to repay the IMF at the market price (recall the risk-free
interest rate is nil); however, as in the case of the international lender, the IMF cannot act as a residual claimant and
is not repaid in the event of default. More specically, at the nal stage the country decides to default strategically
if the following is true:
zY (;R)   D + R     R () z  ^ z(;R) 
D + 
Y (;R)








[zY (;R)   D   ]dF(z)  R:
The condition above is satised by construction, implying that the IMF intervention clears the incentive to
default on the liquidity shock at t = 2. At t = 0 the country chooses how to allocate resources between public
22This way, we propose a simplied setting for the analysis of Flexible Credit Lines (FCL), a new IMF instru-
ment available without ex-post conditionality for member countries that satisfy pre-determined criteria (for details see:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/fac/2009/032409.htm)
23expenditure and reserves by maximizing the following expected utility:
max
R2[0;D)
E(UIMF(;R)) = R + (1   )
Z 1
 z(p;R)
[zY (;R)   D]dF(z) + 
Z 1
^ z(p;R)
[zY (;R)   D   ]dF(z):








 = (1   F(^ z(;R))) + (1   )(1   F( z(;R))):
The intervention of the IMF introduces a trade-o into the model. On the one hand, the problem of insurance
against liquidity shock disappears. On the other hand, the probability of the country's default on debt at t = 4 is
higher than in the case of no liquidity shock, because the outstanding debt is higher in that case. Consequently,
the associated threshold below which the country defaults increases in the event of a liquidity shock (with probability
).
The trade-o above implies that the intervention of the IMF impacts on the lender's break-even problem solution
in an interesting fashion, especially when compared to the solution of the lender problem in the cases of plan F and
plan N. More specically, since, with respect to plan F (see equation 4), the country will default more often on
its debt under IMF intervention, the lender will set a lower discount factor  when the IMF intervenes. However,
if we compare the optimal value of  with the IMF against the one under plan N (see equation ??), the contrary
is true, so that, everything else being equal, the value of  under IMF intervention should be higher than in the no
injection case (N).
[FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE]
The simulations are reported in Figure 10. By comparing the levels of expected welfare, it is clear that IMF
intervention is preferred to the other plans. Under the IMF scenario, the rate of return (respectively, discount
factor) set by the lender is always higher (lower) than the one set under plan F due to the trade-o discussed
above. However, the rate of return under IMF intervention is lower than under plan N, since when the IMF
intervenes the lender expects the country not to default should a liquidity crisis occur. Reserves are also slightly
lower with the IMF than under plan F, although this dierence is not very large.
Overall, this extension predicts that the intervention by an international organization to solve the liquidity
crisis does not reduce signicantly the will to accumulate reserves. In fact, even though reserves are no longer
needed to face the liquidity shock, they are still a form of saving in which the country can invest and retain in the
event of default. Consequently, the optimal portfolio allocation still prescribes a positive amount of safe and liquid
assets.
Finally, the combined eect of the accumulated level of reserves and the higher probability of default in a liquidity
crisis implies that the lender xes a cost of debt with the IMF that is larger than under plan F. This shows that,
per-se, when liquidity crises can occur IMF intervention does not necessarily ease the pressure on the sovereign
debt rate of return. To accomplish this result, the nancial instrument proposed by a supranational organization, or
simply bilateral agreements, should be designed to limit country's incentive to default on debt.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the discussion about the management of liquidity and the optimal level of sovereign
reserves for countries that are subject to liquidity crises. We are able to model simultaneously endogenous debt
prices, optimal reserve accumulation and strategic default decisions. In our setup, the country optimally decides the
level of international reserves that maximizes its expected welfare taking into account the probability of a liquidity
24crisis and the possibility of defaulting (with the cost in terms of output of this action). Competitive international
lenders anticipate the country choice and set a rate of return over the lent resources that satises the zero-prot
condition. Therefore, we deliver a model that abstracts from the role of reserves in managing the exchange rate
and that instead draws on the opportunity cost of holding reserves in terms of reduced expected output.
Our results rationalize the self-insurance motive for accumulating reserves and facing liquidity shocks, as well
as the limited liability eect due to the impossibility for the country to commit not to default on its debt. The
combination of these two forces drives our results: we show that both an equilibrium featuring the country self-
insuring against the shock and one with the country not facing the shock can emerge depending on the productivity
process, the amount of resources available in the country and the probability and dimension of the liquidity crisis.
Finally, we are able to reproduce the empirical evidence of Levy Yeyati (2008) and Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil
(2008): the level of international reserves reduces the costs of external debt for sovereign countries that face a high
probability of being hit by a liquidity crisis.
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26A Proof of Lemma 1
The equilibrium value of , denoted , exists and is unique if and only if G() satises the following ve conditions.
Condition (i): 9lim!0 G(:) < 1:
Taking limits, it can be shown that this condition holds:
 ! 0 )  z() ! 1 ) F( z()) ! 1 ) G() ! 0:
Condition (ii): lim!1 G(:) < 1:
Again, taking limits, one has that also condition (ii) holds:
 ! 1 )  z() !
D
Y (1)
) F( z(1)) ! k 2 (0;1) ) G() ! 1   k < 1:
Condition (iii): dG()=d > 0:











(Y ())2 > 0:
Condition (iv): d2G()=d2 < 0:
Condition (iv) is necessary (but not sucient) for uniqueness and imposes a restriction on the curvature of G().





















The second term of (15) is strictly negative, thus the sign of the inequality depends on the sign of the rst term:
we then use the assumption of uniform distribution of z, which implies that df( z())=d = 0, to get that (15) holds
true.
Condition (v): lim!0 dG()=d > 1.
This condition is necessary to make sure that an interior solution exists that is dierent from the trivial one, i.e.
 = 0, to the xed point problem that we are analysing. Taking limits, one has that in the case of the uniform








(Y ())2 = 1: (16)
This result uses the assumption of uniform distribution of z, for which f( z()) does not depend on ,23 and
that
23Here, we are implicitly restricting our attention to the cases where  z() 2 [1 c;1+c], since otherwise the lender would never serve
the country and one would have that the solution to the problem is given by  = 0.
27Y 0() !!0 1;
1
(Y ())2 !!0 1:

B Proof of Lemma 2
The problem solved by the lender under plan N and the one we solved in Lemma 1 are isomorphic. Therefore,
following the steps of the proof in Appendix A with the use of the Envelope Theorem allows us to pin down the
unique reaction function ~ N = N(R) that solves the lender's zero-prot condition.24
Under plan N, the sovereign faces the following problem:
max
R2[0;~ ND)
E(UN(~ N;R)) = R + (1   )
Z 1
 z(~ N;R)
[zY (~ N;R)   D]dF(z): (17)
We now compute the rst order condition of the expression above (and employ the Envelope Theorem when
disregarding the eect of a change of R on ~ N). After setting the resulting derivative with respect to R to zero, we
have:





zdF(z) = 0: (18)
In order to determine the existence of a solution to our problem we need to show two preliminary results. First,
we need to prove that the country does not have an incentive to employ all resources in reserves (i.e. R
N 6= ~ ND).
To see that this is the case, we compute the value of HN(R) as R approaches ~ ND:
lim
R!~ ND







 z(~ N;R)jR!~ N D
zdF(z) =
= 1 + ( 1)(+1) =  1:







=  Y 0(~ N;R)jR!~ ND !  1:
Moreover,
Z 1
 z(~ N;R)jR!~ N D
zdF(z) =
E(zjz   z(~ N;R))






24In particular, notice that when evaluating the limit of G(:;:) as  approaches zero also R tends to zero, because a nil discount factor
implies that the country has no resources available at the investment stage.
28lim
R!~ ND




= 1 ) lim
R!~ ND




1   F( z(~ N;R)) = 0:
Clearly, investing all resources into liquidity is not an optimum for the sovereign.
Now, we need to check that the country does not want to invest the entire allowance in public expenditure (i.e.
R
N 6= 0). In particular, the value of HN(R) as R approaches 0 is equal to:
lim
R!0









So, if HN(R)jR=0 > 0 there exists a solution to the problem under consideration. For HN(R)jR=0 to be positive
it must be that, when all resources are invested in productive inputs, the production function is close to exhausting
its returns to scale and its derivative with respect to R is small enough to bring the second term of HN(R)jR=0 to
a value smaller than 1 (recall that @Y (:;:)=@R =  Y 0(:;:) < 0 and @2Y=@R2 = Y 00 < 0).25
Finally, the uniqueness of the solution to the problem in (17) is granted if the maximand is concave. More
specically, the derivative of HN(R) must be negative.
dHN(R)
dR
















































































For given  2 (0;1) and g, such expression goes to zero if  is small enough.
26Notice that, for ease of exposition, in the following we are dropping functional forms.






() j z;Rj < jY 0;Rj: (24)
Which is equivalent to (A1).
To close the proof, the value of R
N that solves (18) needs to be plugged into ~ N to compute the optimal discount
factor set by creditors under plan N. 
C Proof of Lemma 3
Also in this case, the problem solved by the lender under plan F and the one we solved in Lemma 1 are isomorphic,
so we follow the steps of the proof in Appendix A with the use of the Envelope Theorem to pin down the reaction
function ~ F = F(R) that solves the lender's participation constraint.
Under plan F, the sovereign faces the following maximization problem:
max
R
E(UF(~ F;R)) = R +
Z 1
 z(~ F;R)
[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z)   : (25)
Under the resource and the no-default constraints:
Z 1
 z(~ F;R)
[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z)  ;
R  :
We solve the problem by maximizing the following expression, where we denote the Lagrange multipliers by 
and :27
L(R;;) = R +
Z 1
 z(~ F ;R)
[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z)    + 
Z 1
 z(~ F ;R)
[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z)   

  (R   ):
The relevant constraints are given below:
@L(R;;)
@R












[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z)    = 0 (27)
@L(R;;)
@












  0;  0 (31)
There are four cases to be discussed.
27Note that, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the maximand is concave under (A1).
30Case I:  =  = 0.








dF(z) = 0: (32)
We know from Lemma 2 that the left-hand-side of the equality above tends to ( 1) as R tends to ~ FD. Thus,
one has that if the following holds,
lim
R!








zdF(z) > 0; (33)
the solution to the problem is given by R
F 2 (; ~ FD).
Case II:  > 0,  = 0.
In this case, the no-default constraint is binding, while the resource constraint is slack (meaning that R > 
at this candidate equilibrium). The optimal level of reserves and the Lagrange multiplier  are determined by the
following conditions:









[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z) = :
Therefore, the optimal value of reserves R
F is computed by solving the no-default constraint for R and the


















Note that for  to be strictly positive it has to be that at R














This condition holds if the value of R that solves the no-default condition in this sub-case is lower than the
one given in case II, because there the no-default constraint is slack at the equilibrium and the same no-default
constraint is decreasing in R.28 Therefore, for R
F >  to be an equilibrium in this case two conditions must hold;
namely, (32) and (34).
28For completeness, notice that
( @Y (~ F;R)=@R)
Z 1
 z(~ F ;R)
zdF(z)jR=R
F > 0 (35)
at any nite value of R in (; ~ FD).
31Case III:  = 0,  > 0.
In this case, the no-default constraint is slack. Instead, the resource constraint is binding. Then, the optimal










F =  is an equilibrium if
lim
R!









which is equivalent to condition (33) above and implies that  > 0.
Case IV :  > 0,  > 0.
In this case, both the no-default constraint and the resource constraint are binding. The equilibrium would be
determined by:
















[zY (~ F;R)   D]dF(z) >  8 2 [0; ~ FD):
Indeed, if  = 0, then, by construction,
R 1
 z(~ F;)[zY (~ F;)   D]dF(z) > 0. Moreover, given that @Y (:;:)=@R < 0,
if  increases to ~ FD then
R 1
 z(~ F;)[zY (~ F;)   D]dF(z) goes to 0. However, the country cannot deplete available
resources in reserves, because the lender would reply by setting a nil value of the discount factor. Hence, this case
cannot be an equilibrium of the maximization problem.
Finally, to get the equilibrium value of  one has to use the optimal level of R obtained in each case above and
plug it into ~ F.
D Extension with Distributions with Exponential Density Functions
In this extension, we relax the assumption of uniform distribution to show under which conditions the results of
the paper carry over in a setting with exponential density functions.
We use the assumption of uniform distribution to derive the xed point that solves the lender's break-even
condition. More specically, we employ the assumption on the shape of z to show that condition (iv) and condition
(v) hold true in the proof of Lemma 1.





















In the case of uniform distributions (36) is satised, because f( z(:)) is constant in  (the second term is negative
independently of the type of distribution assumed). In the case of exponential distributions, a sucient condition
















(37) is negative if @f( z())=@z  0 and this is the case if the following assumption holds:
A2 : i: z s F(z) s.t. argmaxz f(z) = E(z) = 1.
ii: E(z)Y (;R)   D = Y (;R)   D > 0.
The implications of (A2) are two: the rst is that f(z) reaches its maximum at E(z) = 1 and the second is that
the expected value of the production plan is ex-ante protable, so that  z() < 1. Consequently, f(z) is increasing
in z when it is evaluated in  z().








(Y ())2Y 0()D2 = 1: (38)
In the proof of Lemma 1, the result above follows from
Y 0() !!0 1
and from the fact that for a uniform distribution the value of f( z()) is a constant in , hence
1
(Y ())2 !!0 1:
When analysing the case of exponential distributions, one needs to show that
f( z())
(Y ())2 !!0 1:
We can prove it by making use of the following condition:
A3 : lim!0 Y 2() < lim!0 f( z()).
The inequality above uses a specic innitesimal order that is satised by a production function that meets
Inada Conditions and exponential density functions. An example may provide a better understanding of why this
is the case. Assume z s N(0;1) and dene (1=Y ()) = x, then




t f(x) !!0 ex:



















































t=1 - Liquidity shock Nature
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Figure 2: Game-tree with the country's payos
36?
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Figure 4: Equilibrium discount factors
38Figure 5: Numerical example - liquidity shock likelihood ()
39Figure 6: Numerical example - productivity shock variance (c2=3)
40Figure 7: Numerical example - liquidity injection ()
41Figure 8: Risk-averse country
42Figure 9: Comparison, risk-neutral v. risk-averse country
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